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I:< THE SUPRE:·lE COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
'.>OuDRUFF ASHTON, BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs 
WILFORD ASHTON and VIRGINIA 
ASHTON, 
Case No. 19129 
Defendants/Appellants. 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
On 18 November 1968, Frank Ashton, now deceased, conveyed 
111ter vi vos real property to his brother, Defendant lhlford 
htc•n and his sister-in-law, Virginia Ashton, as joint 
tcna:1ts 
l'laintiff /Respondent filed an action, alleging, among 
other things, that the inter-vivos conveyance had been made 
the intent of the granter, Decedent Frank Ashton, that 
one-half (1/2) of the subject property was to be held in 
trust, for his benefit, until his marital difficulties were 
l'Liintiff/Respondent, in his action to compel Wilford 
Vlrginia Ashton to convey the subject property, i.e., 
half of the property conveyed in an alleged inter 
that at the time Frank Ashton conveyed the property to 
Wilford and Virginia Ashton, that DclcnJant \,'ill,,, u <'t1lo,, 
promised decedent Frank Ashton that he would Llln\·ey the " 
half of the property after \.Joodruff' s "marital difficult; 
had been straightenes out." (TT: 36, 10-13) Woodruff Asht 0c. 
further alleged that a constructive trust was created in his 
favor. Woodruff Ashton pleaded that failing a court imposed 
constructive trust, he would be entitled to the east half o'. 
the subject property by way of adverse possession. 
Defendants/Appellants, advanced affirmative defenses, 
such as the statute of frauds, dead man's statutes, statute 
of limitations and the fact that the statutory requirements 
of adverse possession had not been met. 
On 1 February 1983, trial was held in the Fifth Judici2 
District Court, the Honorable Christian Ronnow. Judge Pro 
Temporare presiding. It is from the errors of trial that 
Defendants/Appellants advance the instant appeal 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF /RESPONDENT DID NOT MEET HIS BURDECJ or 
PROOF ON ANY LEGAL OR FACTUAL ISSUE OF THE 
CASE. 
A. The evidence does not warrant creating d 
property interest by a constructive trust, by virtue uf 
failure of the Respondent to meet the elements of a result 1 • 
or constructive trust. 
B. Interest in real property is for gond reasc:., 
' - -
created and preserved. Respondent's evidence in 
thib does not to the level of creating resulting 
01 constructive trust, by its burden of clear and convincing 
evidence as articulated in this Court's case of Carnesecca 
v Carnesecca, 752 P. 2d 708. 
There is, of course, the intervention of equity, where 
Lhe legal elements are lacking, but in the instant action, 
the quantum of respondent's proof falls far short of that 
which is required to sustain an equitable remedy. 
There can be little disagreement that "real estate is 
presumed to be owned by the one in whose name the record 
title stands." Ward v Ward, 172 p.2d 978, 987 (Okla. 1946), 
Jacobson v Jacobson, 557 P.2d 156, 158 (Utah 1976). 
At trial, Plaintiff/Respondent Woodruff Ashton relied 
i.11 chief, as to his evidence that a constructive or resulting 
trust was created in his favor, essentially upon the admissions 
of his brother, Wilford Ashton, which purportedly took place 
during a family gathering on December 13, 1968. 
Plaintiff/Respondent Woodruff Ashton testified that on 
the day of his brother Frank's funeral, while the family was 
gathered for a family meal, that his brother Wilford stated 
in the kitchen of l.Jilford's home, "I promised Frank that I 
would give Cub (nickname for Plaintiff/Respondent Woodruff) 
cl1c '2cht half of the field" (referring to the east half of 
the pr,,pc rt y held in joint tenancy by Wilford and Virginia 
-3-
Ashton as was conveyed by Frank Ashtun 011 Jo .:L'\'L'mb<:: }•,;', 
(TT: 3 5 , 2 5 1 bid - 3 b , l \ 
Connell, his nephew Robert Connell, :rnd :iis nep:1ew c;,,r:i 
Ashton confirm that in substance Wilford Ashton had made 
statement, Defendant/Appellanl Wilford Ashton has nu panicc, 
memory or recollection of the date in queslion or the facts 
and circumstances surrounding his alleged statem.:nt, but 
deny promising any conveyance of said properly. (TT 
19) 
Defendants/Appellants admit that due to the passage ul 
some fourteen (14) vears, that they are unable to recall ::c 
facts and circumstances at the time of the purported stateme:.: 
but both \Jilford Ashton and Virginia Ashton deny that o'-lch a 
statement was made. (TT: 277, 19 and 364, 12-16) 
If, however, this court was to view the alleged ildmi,,,, 
by a party opponent, in its most favorable light to Respun·:e 
there would simply not be enough evidence of a 
co:1vincing n,1ture that 1<.1c'uld \ .. a jury findin1_; <.Jl a 
resulting trust in L1\'Ur of Plaint ilL ResponJenL 
l f t hi s L' u u r t v i e "" s t he t L, ;15 c r i p t , i t i " J us L 
possible to conclude that thl' sLitemcent, if any olatL'l»c:l'. 
was made, whic:h is denied by De:ee:ll',rnts 1 Appellants, o ,,:·, 
statement would be nolhing nure tlL1n a gr:illlituus ,i1;.:r 
·'" the part of Defend,mt/Appellant Wilford Ashton. There is 
no evidence that the decedent, Frank Ashton, required or 
.olicited a promise or detrimentally relied thereon from 
Wilford Ashton as a condition of conveying the property in 
joint tenancy to Wilford and Virginia Ashton in 1968. 
Presumably, evidence at the time of the execution of 
the Deed would have shed light upon whether or not Frank 
Ashton. decedent and granter, required some type of promise 
or precondition in the conveyance of said deed. 
Ironically, the attorney who drafted and notarized the 
deed of joint tenancy from Frank Ashton to Wilford and 
Virginia Ashton, was Phillip L. Foremaster, now Attorney for 
Plaintiff /Respondent. At trial, Defendants/Appellants 
specifically waived any potential conflict of interest and 
called Phillip L. Foremaster as a defense witness. 
Xr Foremaster testified, under oath, and understandably 
so. that he had no independent recollection of the conveyance 
of 18 November 1968. Defendant/Appellant Wilford Ashton 
ll!>I if1ed with particular clarity that the deed was drafted 
bv Attorney Phil lip L Foremaster, that his brother Frank 
sq;ned the deed in the presence of i-lr. Foremaster, as is 
e\·idl'nc"ed by Mr. Forernaster' s notary seal. (TT: 277, where 
·:r ;,shtc'li testified that the decedent, Frank Ashton, Grantor, 
..11,l not plac·e any preconditions upon the execution of said 
-5-
deed 
c·1r. Foremas te r, while denying any indepcnJen L r'-', "l 1, 
does concede, on page 271 of Lhe L1·1cil Lr<1nscripL, L:BL ht· 
may very well have drafted the deed and notario:ed the sit,::dt.r 
of the decedent, Grantor Frank Ashlon 
It would stretch the imagination to believe that an 
attorney of the caliber, competency, and experience of 
Phillip L. Foremaster would have drafted and executed a deed 
in his presence that was preconditioned to be conveyed to a 
third party. It would follow, therefore, that since the 
only evidence of the resulting or constructive trust at the 
time of the making of the deed is the evidence rendered bv 
Defendant/Appellant Wilford Ashton that the burden of pro•.f 
of clear and convincing evidence simply fell far short as 
required by law. 
The Honorable Justice Wolfe, in the case of Greener 
v Greener, 212 p. 2d 194 (Utah 1949), eloquently defines LLc 
clear and convincing standards, and explains the legal 
confusion which will result when it is abandoned 
That proof is convincing which carries with it, not 
only the power to persuade the mind as to the probable 
truth or correctness of the fact it purports to prove, 
but has the element of clinching such truth or 
correctness. Clear and convincing proof clincheY 
what might be otherwise only probably to mind 
We have no measuring rod Lo lay alongside of the proct 
to ascertain whether it meets Lhe various tests 
signified by the terms, "barely" or "merely" or 
"slightly" preponderating" or "fairly", "greaLl::" 
or "overwhelmingly prepondering ", noi- can we 
measure the content of such tci-ms as clear ..ind ··"n•:,i,cL:, 
i;1edsure :.he content of such terms as clear and convincing 
"l>e:,'ond " reasonable doubt" (which we take to mean 
•he sdme dS free irom r<'asonable doubt), "unquestionably 
'un'.·i11ci11g." These terms deal with states of mind 
.111d to a degree vary as to the content put into them 
Js minds vary. They all have implicit in them the idea 
uf comparativeness, each with another's standards, 
signify more or less degrees of proof. 
But for a matter to be clear and convincing to a 
particular mind, it must at least have reached 
the point where there remains no serious or substantial 
doubt as to correctness of the conclusion. A mind 
which was of the opinion that it was convinced and 
yet which entertained, not a slight, but reasonable 
doubt as to the correctness of its conclusion, would 
seem to be in a state of confusion. This means that 
more than the usual modicum of evidence is required 
to meet the clear and convincing evidence standard 
of Jewell v Horner, 366 P 2d 594 (Utah 1961). 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT RENDERED 
IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT 
AS TO ANY CONVEYANCE, OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, 
AS TO THE CONVEYANCE OF THE WHOLE PARCEL OF 
PROPERTY CONVEYED BY THE DECEDENT, THE 
COURT THEREBY CONVEYING PROPERTY BELONGING 
TO VIRGINIA ASHTON AS WELL. 
The property was conveyed in joint tenancy to Wilford 
anJ Virginia Ashton, husband and wife, as joint tenants. 
It is well settled in Utah that a spouse who holds a 
•. ceJ in joint tenancy with his or her spouse, only has right 
do tu one-half of the subject property. 
Section 30-2-1 Utah Code Annotated as Amended 1953, 
'c.'i!'E':.; RIGHT TO PROPERTY -- LIABILITY FOR HUSBAND'S DEBT 
-7-
Real and personal cstc1t e "t l'Vc·rv ternj, ,. 
acquired befcnc• marri.igc, «nd all p1 upc•rt: 
to which she m;1y aftenvdrds becon:e l'IlLiL!e, 
to by p u r ch as e , - 6 i f t , g rem L , in h c: r i Lrn ,_ e , 
bequest or devise, sh:ill be and remai11 the 
estate and property of such female and not 
be liable for the debts, obligations, or 
engagements of her husband, and mav be 
conveyed, devised or bequeathed by.her 
as if she were unmarried. 
Since on November 18, 1968. she was given property by 
the decedent, Frank Ashton, her brother-in-law, as a gitt, 
her husband unilaterally does not have the right to give 
away her vested interest. 
The record is totally void of any evidence in any shape 
or form, that shows that Virginia Ashton did anything thdt 
would remotely create a constructive or resulting trust in 
favor of the Respondent. (TT : 3 6 4 , 12 - 16 ) . 
Not only does Utah's statutory authority hold the 
proposition that the independent rights of a joint tl'nJnt 
spouse but the same is well settled on the subject by Ut•h 
cases. 
Where a husband and wife hold property so acquired as 
joint owners, either may transfer his interests in the 
property so held without affecting the interest of the 
other. Since the rights of each spouse are alienable, anv 
purchaser or encumbrancer does not become a joint ten;int i:, 
the property, but becomes a tenant in common with the rrm 
spouse. Clearfield State Bank 562 P 
1
--
The law in Utah clearly states that a joint tena11t 
-b-
Jisposc of more than his interest in joint tenancy 
i.c , one-hdlf (112) thereof. Tracy-Collins 
;;·u,;t 5 Utdh 2d 350, 301 P.2d 1086 (1956). 
Arpc!lants do not concede that there is a quantum of evidence 
tJ fi11J clear and convincing evidence as against Defendants/Ap-
e I !ants, but 1-:ould advance totally that the trial court 
erred in finding that the whole of the subject property 
, c•n\'c:-·ed b\· the grant or, decedent Frank Ashton, would be 
cct to the .d lcgcd promise or precondition creating a 
,,,.·i!Lcn,; tn,;ct in td\'Or of Pldintiff/Respondent. 
fo folio" the legal analysis in joint tenancy, based 
:pc·:\ the sheer 1ceight of authority, both in the State of 
[tah elsewhere had Defendant/Appellant Wilford Ashton 
JicJ dl <Jny point prior to the instigation of this action, 
t!w:i it "·ould fol low that she would have taken, under the 
rii;'"t s 0f survivorship of joint tenancy, her fee simple 
interest in the subject property, not subject to the claims 
o:· instarit action. 
POINT I II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT SUA SPONTE. 
fHE COURT DID ALLOW THE TESTIMONY OF 
,.\:; EXPERT WITNESS, STIPULATED AS TO 
l_)L'ALIFICATIO:' BY PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT'S 
1'1 
Lo\:n· Snc>\c, Jn attorney, and President of a title 
,n\ ,,) leJ Ciy Defendants/Appellants as a witness to 
-9-
explain as to technical matters of conveyance by de, J ::ic 
Court Sua Sponte, cul off Snow's lest irnuny \T, ""J.,-
407) . 
Defendants/Appellants' c:ounscl then used the questio,
1 
and answers method to attempt to get the Cou1·t Lo all t'-,,, 
testimony to come in. It is advanced by DefenJanls/ Appel : 0, 
that Mr. Snow's testimony was absolutelv "'_ital as to the 
technical matters so that the jury could well understanc the 
effects of the various deeds and conveyances that were 
pertinent to the instant action. 
Defendants/Appellants counsel attempted to inform the 
court as to the net effect of a subsequent conveyance, wou'.d 
have terminated the joint tenancy relationship (i.e , 
if at all, respondents interest vested), that Defendant/Apr'·";· 
Virginia Ashton would not have given up her rights but that 
the joint tenancy would have terminated and a tenancy in 
common would have materialized. 
It would seem that the authorities are well settled 
that any attempt at conveyancing to a third party bv a co-
tenancy destroys the joint tenancy relationship 
Attempt was made during trial for Defendants/Appellant 1 
counsel to explain to the Court the net effect counsel Wo• 
summarily cut off from his .rnd it appeared fr •r• 
the record that the Court failed Lo undei:stand what Defend.·' 
lants would advance is the status of the LH.J as to ;i c·onn " 
or an attempt to do so by one of the c·o-tenants. (TT 
- 1 u -
:." ,·lic)tl cJ) o! \'olumc 20 of Am Jur, 2d., articulates the 
-.• ·c· . i - : c· l [ l c• cl l dh' "Since Lhere is, merely by reason of the 
of a co-tenancy, no agency relationship between 
c0-LcnJnls, Lhe courts are agreed that one co-tenant 
c"nn01 ordin:.irily transfer or dispoae of the interest of 
co-tenant in such a manner as to be binding, unless 
autl10rized to do so. Nor can a co-tenant, as a rule, 
"'"'' '.1is c·o-tenants by any unauthorized attempt to alienate 
0r , :h:J::<'JL'r Lhc entire estcite or any specific portion thereof. 
,:;: .•. 1·: undi,·ideJ interest in any such portion. In the 
.ili-.c1·" e of ,1uthoriLdtion or ratific:Jtion on the part of his 
,- .. •-: c·:i.tnts. dny dealings on the part of one co-tenant in 
:·el,.t ion to lhe common property is mere nullity insofar as 
:lw.1 1nLeresLs are concerned On the other hand, and in 
J,corJJnce with well-settled rules stated elsewhere in this 
it is clear that an unauthorized act of the kind under 
•• :io1Jc'ration mdy be affirmed or ratified by the other co-
or they may estop themselves by their conduct from 
:; .. c· :1.•ning its validity, in which case it becomes as binding 
':"'"' .is :hough they had joint therein Mere failure to 
.1 l1;ins:1c·tion of this kind, however, does not 
.11[,_· !'l'l'cludc the non-consenting tenants from asserting 
:1:._--, u11less Ll1ey have ,icquiesce<l therein in one 
-11-
\.,'av or the other, there L·.:in be no f,1i_- e::,tuppl'l ll'. 
pa is 
(1 . I•!' 
be ,Jffected .... •nly by the jl..1 inL 1.)r t.:ut1cur1·12l1L act10:1 ul 
co - o\,'Tl er s , i t is c 1 ear that in the "b sen<.: e of au:_ ho r i,.,, L i 
ratification any at tempt at con\·eyancy thereof b»· or,<-' 
ten an t i s no t b ind in g upon h i s co - L en .. rn t s , and L' p" i: .d c • t 0 
pass title to nothing more Lhan the sellers' 
This cloes not r:iecin, however, that such d convevance '.,i1 
safely be ignc•1·ed, entry unJl'r a deed of this char'-!Ller "nJ 
3ssertion of exclusive O\-ll!t:rship thereunder, constitute dn 
c•uster, and the grantee, may, in Lime, acquire t>,ood Litle bv 
ln tl1e of re.:Il estate, the i:un-
,1 s scr ting l..'U- tenant may, i he chuoses not LO rd ti f y l hl'. 
to recover the property (Emphasis addeJJ 
S inc e no e vi den c e was eve r p re sen Le d ind i c a t in,; L le J l 
Defenclant,'Appellant Virginia Ashton ever .. 1 any P•J[•ur' 
conveyance by her husband, her portion uf the J••int Le:1£•'.•·-
JL'STlCE WOGLD or::::.A::o ,\ ::u-: TRJ!d. DLL 
TO Tl\E PH\'SlC\I 1:;c,\l'ACl IY ul- .-\::;du!\ 
- l 
.:..1 :he> t1:ce of !rid] and during the time that he was 
·-." .:ii;. Cle1c:1Janl/Appellanl \hlford Ashton was under 
physical duress. At the conclusion of his testimony, 
hL' wJs taken that very evening, by ambulance, to the Dixie 
:!cclic·al Center, where he was hospitalized and placed in the 
L'3re unit Since neither Defendants were available 
:he time of final argument, Counsel for Defendants/Appellants, 
of the trial court that the court explain to the 
Jbsencc of Defendants/Appellants. The Court simply 
,.d.LL· : c• the jury that the Defendants were "Excused", thus 
, t.-.< ;t.t; the prejudicial inference that their absence was a 
;;-,L -:·l t.';..;.'- :..1se fur nut being present 
fur Defendants/Appellants further request that the 
LL",,. 1n101·:c the jurv L,f the physical nature of the illness, 
s,. prcecLtde the prejudicial effect of the jury drawing 
DefenJants Appellants candidly admit 
thcv .Ju 111.._1L knoh' h'hat conclusions, if any, were drawn 
.<:C\ r·.1cerc:bc·1· uf the jury, but il would seem logical that 
.. ,, "·.Jic'. '.nfc·1· lhJl Defl.'ndants//\ppellants had so little 
: , ,1 ; 1-. t !-.l' L·.Jst' Lhdt they '"ere conspicuously absent at 
. "l DefenJants/Appellants acknowledge 
• L liL'l the? Jutv of the Supreme Court to weigh and 
,j, However, it is noteworthy 
1:.c· c·\·,,lc·nLe ;,-, tins L·dse did not meet inany \vay its 
- .. 3 -
1\l ::..,t_;\'L'l·,1; 
(TT 371, 9-19. . .'.+Ob--'+09, lt\2. 11-2)) 
Dismiss based on the l a c· k of r: \'id c n c· '-' , bu l such was (1 \'err_,'., 
and denied. \TT 387, 13-22). 
co:KLUS 10:; 
I FOR ALL THE REASo:-is SET FORT!! ,\BOVE' TlllS conn Slll'c;_o 
REVERSE THE JL:DG:C!E:\T OF THE LOWER COURT, A\.JARDLG JllJC::i::::; 
AGAINST PLAI:\TlfF/ RESPO:rnENT, FOR FAILCRE TO H,\VE CARRIED 
THE BlRDEN OF PROOF. 
J l ALTER.'lATlVELY' TO STRlKJ:: ALL Al.JAROS le'1 F1\\'•JR Oi' RL:::•/,cc, 
A:;o Rt::!A::o TO THE LO\.JER COURT FOR ,\ TRIAL' \.J lTH Sl'EI Ir [i, 
L\STRCCTllJC\S AS TO THAT PORTIO:\ OF THE PROPJ::RTY O\.J::rn 
\'I RGI:nA ASHTo:;' 
I I I ,\LTER:,,.'\Tl\'ELY' FOR ,\ ::u; TRl:\L o:; ALL lSSL'ES 
COURT DELcS ,\l'l'ROPRL\TE 
I 
... ' <..-{ / t 
CUZTlFlCATE OF MAlLI;JG 
10 _\, l mdi leJ two (2) copies of the within and foregoing 
:ir,l class postage fully prepaid to 
: i 1 ip L Furem3ster 
:·::.L·y at L0w 
,.I s " l L1 J [ 
St C..:orgc·, l:tdh 
- 15 -
